The Emperor's Power Over The Good: Are They Bound To Obey Him In Everything? Chapter 20 ~ William Of Ockham
PAOLO VENEZIANO
Coronation of the Virgin
1324
The Emperor's power over the Good: Are they bound to obey him in everything?
CHAPTER 20
Student We have sought to learn what power the emperor has over those who are bad; let us now investigate what power he possesses over the good who are subject to him. I especially want to ask, however, whether the emperor has such power over the good subject to him that all of them are bound to obey him in everything.
Master The reply is that no one should obey him in unlawful and unjust matters.
Student Should all so obey him in everything lawful that whoever refuses to obey him in anything lawful commits a sin?
Master The reply is that it is not the case from this that anyone who [[reading qui to govern obedierit]] does not obey him in something lawful should be judged to be sinning. For if he were to order someone to fast or not to drink wine or some such thing that does not pertain to the office of emperor, he would not be bound to obey him, but in those things which pertain to the government of people in temporal affairs, everyone is bound to obey him.
Student Is anyone more bound to obey the emperor in matters of this kind than anyone else inferior to him, such as his king or duke or margrave or another direct lord of his? For it seems that just as a bishop is superior to an abbot and yet notwithstanding this in many matters monks are more bound to obey their abbot than their bishop, so notwithstanding the fact that the emperor is superior to kings, dukes and other temporal lords, the subjects of other lords are nevertheless more bound to obey their direct lords than the emperor.
Master The reply is that just as, according to many people, the pope is the direct head of all christians in spiritual matters in such a way that in all matters of this kind everyone is more bound to obey him than any inferior head at all, so the emperor is the direct lord of everyone in temporal affairs in such a way that in those matters that pertain to the government of mortals the emperor ought more to be obeyed than any inferior lord. Blessed Augustine seems to think this. Writing about the Letter to the Romans he says about the words, "Those who resist will incur judgement" [Rom. 13:2], "If the proconsul himself should order something and the emperor another thing, is it doubted that with the former spurned the latter should be served?" Also in the second book of his Confessions, included in dist. 8, c. Que contra [c.2, col.13], the same man says, "In regard to the powers in human society, the greater power should be put before the lesser for obedience." The emperor should always be more obeyed, therefore, than any inferior lord at all.
Student Two unsuitable [conclusions] seem to follow from this. The first is that everyone is a slave of the emperor and that no one man is more a slave of the emperor than another, nor, with respect to the emperor, is one man freer than another, because those who are equally bound to obey someone are equally his slave or equally free. If all the subjects of the emperor, therefore, are bound to obey him as their direct lord in everything that pertains to the government of the people, all are equally his slaves or equally free.
The second unsuitable [conclusion] that seems to follow is that anyone who was to come with his lord to war against the emperor would commit the crime of lese-majeste, because anyone who is a direct subject of the emperor commits the crime of lese-majeste if he thinks the death of the emperor, which that person does who comes to a mortal battle against the emperor. Now tell me what is said about these two points.
Master In response to the first it is said that it does not follow from the above, because, as was said earlier, the subjects of the emperor are not bound to obey him in everything but only in those matters that pertain to the government of the people, that is in those things that are necessary for ruling the people subject to him justly and beneficially. And therefore if he were to command something which was contrary to the benefit of the people subject to him, he would not have to be obeyed. And hence it is that the servants of the emperor and those who are free are not bound to obey him equally, but his servants are bound to obey him in many matters in which the free are not bound. For solely at the command of the emperor his servants are bound to abandon to him all the goods that they possess without his alleging some common benefit, but the free are not bound to this and the emperor can not command it of them without its being advantageous to the common good, indeed without its being a clear necessity. Servants of the emperor are bound to obey him in many other matters as well to which the free are not obligated. For it would detract from the dignity of the human race if all were servants of the emperor, and it would detract in a similar way, therefore, if the emperor could treat the free like servants in everything. Since the emperor is bound to make provision for those things which pertain to the benefit and dignity of the whole human race, therefore, he should in no way wish to treat the free as servants. The free are not bound, therefore, to obey him in everything in which his servants are bound to obey him.
In regard to the second, it is granted that anyone coming with any lord of his to an unjust war against the emperor falls into the crime of lese-majeste and should be punished with the penalty for that crime. The emperors Honorius and Arcadius in the ninth book of their codex on the Julian law of majesty, found in 6, q. 1, Si quis [c.22, col.560], seem to attest to this when they say, "If anyone joins a wicked faction with knights or infantry, even barbarians, or receives or gives the oath of allegiance of that faction concerning the death of even illustrious men who attend the councils and assembly of us and of the senators too - for they too are part of our body - or finally thinks of this of anyone who fights for us (for the laws want the willing of a crime, by which it is effected, to be punished with the same severeity) let him be struck by the sword as if guilty of lese-majesty, with all their goods yielded to our fisc. Let their sons, to whom we especially grant life with imperial gentleness - for they, in whom the examples of the paternal, that is the hereditary, crime are measured, ought to perish with the paternal punishment - be held as foreigners from the succession of all that is nearest to them."
Student This seems to conflict with blessed Augustine who asserts that if someone goes to war, he does not sin, even if it is unjust, as long as it is not evident to him that it is unjust. For, as we read in 23, q. 1, c. Quid culpatur [c.4, col.892], he says, "If a just man by chance serves as the soldier of a king, even if the latter is an idolatrous man, he can rightly go to war at that one's command, if, in preserving right order instead of peace, either he is certain that what he is ordered to do is not against the command of God or he is not certain whether it is, so that the injustice of giving the order makes the king guilty while the right order [involved in] serving shows that the soldier is innocent." We can gather from these words that if a king or someone else leads his soldiers even to an unjust war against the emperor, the soldiers can lawfully go to war against the emperor if it is not certain to them that their lord's war is unjust.
Master The reply to this is that if warriors fight with their lord against someone else who is not their lord they are absolved of sin, even if the war is unjust, as long as they do not know this and are not labouring under a negligent and crass ignorance. But if they go to war with an inferior lord against a superior lord of theirs, and especially against the emperor who is their direct lord, they are not absolved of the crime of lese-majeste if the war is unjust, even if they do not know this, because they should rather presume in favour of the emperor that he has a just war than in favour of their inferior lord, and therefore, unless they are certain that their inferior lord has a just war against the emperor, they are not absolved of the crime of lese-majeste.
William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 3, tract 2, book 2.
Text and translation by John Scott.
Copyright (c) 1999, The British Academy
CHAPTER 20
Student We have sought to learn what power the emperor has over those who are bad; let us now investigate what power he possesses over the good who are subject to him. I especially want to ask, however, whether the emperor has such power over the good subject to him that all of them are bound to obey him in everything.
Master The reply is that no one should obey him in unlawful and unjust matters.
Student Should all so obey him in everything lawful that whoever refuses to obey him in anything lawful commits a sin?
Master The reply is that it is not the case from this that anyone who [[reading qui to govern obedierit]] does not obey him in something lawful should be judged to be sinning. For if he were to order someone to fast or not to drink wine or some such thing that does not pertain to the office of emperor, he would not be bound to obey him, but in those things which pertain to the government of people in temporal affairs, everyone is bound to obey him.
Student Is anyone more bound to obey the emperor in matters of this kind than anyone else inferior to him, such as his king or duke or margrave or another direct lord of his? For it seems that just as a bishop is superior to an abbot and yet notwithstanding this in many matters monks are more bound to obey their abbot than their bishop, so notwithstanding the fact that the emperor is superior to kings, dukes and other temporal lords, the subjects of other lords are nevertheless more bound to obey their direct lords than the emperor.
Master The reply is that just as, according to many people, the pope is the direct head of all christians in spiritual matters in such a way that in all matters of this kind everyone is more bound to obey him than any inferior head at all, so the emperor is the direct lord of everyone in temporal affairs in such a way that in those matters that pertain to the government of mortals the emperor ought more to be obeyed than any inferior lord. Blessed Augustine seems to think this. Writing about the Letter to the Romans he says about the words, "Those who resist will incur judgement" [Rom. 13:2], "If the proconsul himself should order something and the emperor another thing, is it doubted that with the former spurned the latter should be served?" Also in the second book of his Confessions, included in dist. 8, c. Que contra [c.2, col.13], the same man says, "In regard to the powers in human society, the greater power should be put before the lesser for obedience." The emperor should always be more obeyed, therefore, than any inferior lord at all.
Student Two unsuitable [conclusions] seem to follow from this. The first is that everyone is a slave of the emperor and that no one man is more a slave of the emperor than another, nor, with respect to the emperor, is one man freer than another, because those who are equally bound to obey someone are equally his slave or equally free. If all the subjects of the emperor, therefore, are bound to obey him as their direct lord in everything that pertains to the government of the people, all are equally his slaves or equally free.
The second unsuitable [conclusion] that seems to follow is that anyone who was to come with his lord to war against the emperor would commit the crime of lese-majeste, because anyone who is a direct subject of the emperor commits the crime of lese-majeste if he thinks the death of the emperor, which that person does who comes to a mortal battle against the emperor. Now tell me what is said about these two points.
Master In response to the first it is said that it does not follow from the above, because, as was said earlier, the subjects of the emperor are not bound to obey him in everything but only in those matters that pertain to the government of the people, that is in those things that are necessary for ruling the people subject to him justly and beneficially. And therefore if he were to command something which was contrary to the benefit of the people subject to him, he would not have to be obeyed. And hence it is that the servants of the emperor and those who are free are not bound to obey him equally, but his servants are bound to obey him in many matters in which the free are not bound. For solely at the command of the emperor his servants are bound to abandon to him all the goods that they possess without his alleging some common benefit, but the free are not bound to this and the emperor can not command it of them without its being advantageous to the common good, indeed without its being a clear necessity. Servants of the emperor are bound to obey him in many other matters as well to which the free are not obligated. For it would detract from the dignity of the human race if all were servants of the emperor, and it would detract in a similar way, therefore, if the emperor could treat the free like servants in everything. Since the emperor is bound to make provision for those things which pertain to the benefit and dignity of the whole human race, therefore, he should in no way wish to treat the free as servants. The free are not bound, therefore, to obey him in everything in which his servants are bound to obey him.
In regard to the second, it is granted that anyone coming with any lord of his to an unjust war against the emperor falls into the crime of lese-majeste and should be punished with the penalty for that crime. The emperors Honorius and Arcadius in the ninth book of their codex on the Julian law of majesty, found in 6, q. 1, Si quis [c.22, col.560], seem to attest to this when they say, "If anyone joins a wicked faction with knights or infantry, even barbarians, or receives or gives the oath of allegiance of that faction concerning the death of even illustrious men who attend the councils and assembly of us and of the senators too - for they too are part of our body - or finally thinks of this of anyone who fights for us (for the laws want the willing of a crime, by which it is effected, to be punished with the same severeity) let him be struck by the sword as if guilty of lese-majesty, with all their goods yielded to our fisc. Let their sons, to whom we especially grant life with imperial gentleness - for they, in whom the examples of the paternal, that is the hereditary, crime are measured, ought to perish with the paternal punishment - be held as foreigners from the succession of all that is nearest to them."
Student This seems to conflict with blessed Augustine who asserts that if someone goes to war, he does not sin, even if it is unjust, as long as it is not evident to him that it is unjust. For, as we read in 23, q. 1, c. Quid culpatur [c.4, col.892], he says, "If a just man by chance serves as the soldier of a king, even if the latter is an idolatrous man, he can rightly go to war at that one's command, if, in preserving right order instead of peace, either he is certain that what he is ordered to do is not against the command of God or he is not certain whether it is, so that the injustice of giving the order makes the king guilty while the right order [involved in] serving shows that the soldier is innocent." We can gather from these words that if a king or someone else leads his soldiers even to an unjust war against the emperor, the soldiers can lawfully go to war against the emperor if it is not certain to them that their lord's war is unjust.
Master The reply to this is that if warriors fight with their lord against someone else who is not their lord they are absolved of sin, even if the war is unjust, as long as they do not know this and are not labouring under a negligent and crass ignorance. But if they go to war with an inferior lord against a superior lord of theirs, and especially against the emperor who is their direct lord, they are not absolved of the crime of lese-majeste if the war is unjust, even if they do not know this, because they should rather presume in favour of the emperor that he has a just war than in favour of their inferior lord, and therefore, unless they are certain that their inferior lord has a just war against the emperor, they are not absolved of the crime of lese-majeste.
William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 3, tract 2, book 2.
Text and translation by John Scott.
Copyright (c) 1999, The British Academy
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